ABSTRACT Studies have highlighted the tensions that can arise between Medicaid managed care organizations and safety net providers. This article seeks to identify what other states can learn from Maryland's effort to include protections for safety net providers in its Medicaid managed care program--HeatthChoice. Under HealthChoice, traditional provider systems can sponsor managed care organizations, historical providers are assured of having a role, patients can self-refer and have open access to certain public health providers, and capitation rates are risk adjusted through the use of adjusted clinical groups and claims data. The article is based on a week-long site visit to Maryland in fall 1998 that was one part of a seven-state study. Maryland's experience suggests that states have much to gain in the way of "good" public policy by considering the impact of their Medicaid managed care programs on the safety net, but states should not underestimate the challenges involved in balancing the need to protect the safety net with the need to contain costs and minimize the administrative burden on providers. No amount of protection can compensate for a poorly designed or implemented program. As the health care environment continues to change, so may the need for and the types of protections change. It also may be most difficult to guarantee adequate protections to those who need it most--among relatively financially insecure providers that have a limited management infrastructure and that depend heavily on Medicaid and the state for funds to care for the uninsured.
assumes that safety net providers need to compete on a level playing field, and their program by design did not treat safety net providers differently from others for the most part. 9 California's two-plan model is structured uniquely to guarantee that extensive public systems, such as those in Los Angeles, maintain a specific market share, requiring that one of the two choices offered by a publicly sponsored plan involves safety net providers and has a guarantee of a specific share of enrollees.
The types of guarantees California uses to protect its safety net exceed those most states are willing to pursue. Yet, states exhibit considerable interest in strategies for employing Medicaid managed care while limiting the adverse effects on the safety net. Maryland's Medicaid managed care program--HealthChoice--is particularly instructive. 1~ It includes various features--currently under consideration by other states--aimed at protecting safety net providers as the state moves toward capitated managed care. Further, several of the features--such as risk adjustment and open access to some types of providers--are program components that other states have considered, but few have adopted.
Here, we review the context and method of our study of Maryland, provide a brief description of the HealthChoice program, describe Maryland's experience with four particular policies aimed at protecting the safety net, and outline the lessons associated with recent experience in Maryland and the other states we studied.
STUDY CONTEXT AND METHODS
This paper is based on a case study of Maryland developed from interviews conducted over I week in fall 1998, as well as on a review of program documentation and a review of and update to the draft by interviewees at the end of 1998.
During the 5-day site visit, we interviewed individuals who brought both state HealthChoice, authorized under a federal Section 1115 waiver of traditional Medicaid rules to support the demonstration, began operations on July 1, 1997, about a year after the waiver received approval and 6 months later than originally planned. Under HealthChoice, all Medicaid beneficiaries, with a few exceptions, are required to enroll in one of the allowed managed care organizations (MCOs).
The exceptions include people with dual eligibility who are covered jointly by
Medicare and Medicaid, those with short-term eligibility in "spend-down" status, institutionalized individuals, and small numbers of individuals in various special-ized and other waiver programs. In addition, individuals with I of 60 specialized "rare and expensive" medical conditions are permitted to opt out into a special program of fee-for-service case-managed care.
From the start, HealthChoice was implemented statewide; in fact, the program employed an enrollment broker to assist in implementation. Beneficiaries received a unified provider directory for their region that listed MCO affiliations; most beneficiaries had 21 days to choose both a health plan and a provider. After that, individuals were assigned automatically to a plan ("autoassignmenr'). Beneficiaries were permitted to make one switch without cause in Year 1, with an annual lock-in applying thereafter. For a variety of reasons, the initial rollout process was chaotic, with call systems overloaded, errors in provider directories, and missing addresses in beneficiary files. The result was high rates of autoassignment, which initially ran between 45% and 57% monthly--among those with good addresses in the system, thus enabling receipt of mailed material. While distinct from the formal safety net protections, Maryland's implementation problerns are important to keep in mind as they have a bearing on safety net providers' experience with HealthChoice.
In contrast to the more limited resources committed to implementation planning, Maryland invested substantially in the design of HealthChoice. The program was developed through an extensive process that lasted over a year and engaged various stakeholders in its design. Traditional providers, advocates, and beneficiary groups participated in the negotiations both during the state's development of the program initiatives and, later, in negotiating legislative language to add explicit provisions to minimize adverse effects on the safety net.
Safety net providers and advocates for low-income populations were represented heavily, and their concerns factored into a number of key features in program design.
HealthChoice contains four main features aimed at protecting the safety net:
1. Requirements that afford provider systems serving the low-income population and other entities an opportunity to sponsor health plans without becoming licensed as an HMO if they meet fiscal solvency and quality standards.
2. A backup requirement that gives the state authority to require an MCO to include a historical provider on its panel (guaranteeing historical providers participation in at least one plan). Maryland rate-setting system, bad debt and charity care have always been allowable costs within reason. In recent years, the system has spread the bad debt burden among all hospitals to reduce the competitive disadvantages for institutions that provide a substantial amount of charity care. Accordingly, Maryland's system should mean that safety net providers--at least in hospital systems--are protected better financially than in many other states and thus are more competitively positioned to move Medicaid toward managed care. The same protections, *HealthChoice also includes other unique features that we do not discuss here because they are tangential to direct safety net protection policies. They include coordinated open enrollment with a 6-month eligibility guarantee and annual lock-in that was phased in as a vehicle for encouraging a "medical home"; an extensive variety of care management requirements and use of encounter data to support performance-based monitoring and feedback; and a distinct mental health carve-out program under the control of the Mental Hygiene Administration that consolidates Medicaid and other public mental health services, but leaves the primary responsibility for primary mental health care in the hands of health plans (for further details, see Ref. 4 ). In addition, Maryland's exception allowing individuals with specified conditions or diagnoses to opt out voluntarily into the fee-forservice managed system offers a protection for specialized providers, many of which are safety net-affiliated through teaching hospitals. For the most part, these are conditions for which only one or two centers of excellence exist. Most of those eligible are children (10% are adults). The program covered 60 diagnoses and 1,500 individuals with expenses of about $10,000 per member per month at the time of our study, although an expansion was under consideration.
however, are less available to community-based providers such as independent community health centers. Arundel counties, beneficiaries can choose from any of the plans.
Of the 9 MCOs that participated at the start of the program, 3 are commercially licensed plans that operated under the previous system (see Table) . Among them, 
PROTECTIONS FOR HISTORICAL PROVIDERS
Under Maryland regulations, MCOs applying for the program must submit extensive data on their network so that the state can assess network adequacy.
In addition to information on contracted providers and capacity, applicants must supply information on procedures for selecting and changing providers, making appointments, following up on patients who fail to keep appointments, and arranging for out-of-area care and care for those with special needs.
To deal with concerns that some traditional providers might be excluded from networks and thus be prevented from participating in Medicaid, the Department The intent of the assignment provision is to guarantee that traditional providers retain the ability to participate in at least one health plan. As of December 1998, HealthChoice received 62 applications for historical provider status, 17 of which had received approval. This is a relatively small share of eligible providers.
Interviewees informed us that most historical providers already had contracts with MCOs, and that plans were interested in contracting with such providers to help them build a strong provider and enrollee base.
Maryland's experience suggests that network inclusion is a limited safeguard for protecting traditional providers. Care systems in Maryland and probably elsewhere operate such that historical providers frequently are either existing network participants or in demand by networks. The more pertinent issue is not whether there is a network contract, but rather whether MCOs direct patients to historical providers and whether safety net providers will be able to retain their patient base and revenue stream as mandatory managed care is introduced.
Evidence suggests that safety net providers were much more likely than other providers to have been affected adversely by the high autoassignment rates and other problems that caused patients to be assigned to a provider they did not choose. They also were affected more by the confusion among beneficiaries about how the system should work and where to seek care. are unusual compared with policies in other states, which typically leave most *MCOs are responsible for all substance abuse services and for primary mental health care that they believe falls within the scope of practice and for developing arrangements for referral and coordination with the mental health system, but enrollees can also selfrefer to this system, which is financed separately by the state mental health agency on an at-risk basis. Because of its perceived equity, risk adjustment has gained widespread support in Maryland. However, the technical design of the HealthChoice risk-adjustment system remains the subject of debate. In particular, the decision to combine existing MCO enrollees with new individuals eligible for Medicaid in the same risk pool has triggered controversy. New plans (mostly provider sponsored) fear that combined risk pooling will affect them adversely because MCO enrollees under the previous system (which had as participants commercial, but not new, MCOs) included few individuals on Supplemental Security Income. In fact, some evidence suggests that fears are not without basis. 15 Another concern is that the nine diagnostic groups may not provide stable risk adjustment when some plans have small enrollments. Separating HIV from AIDS in the risk-adjustment categories has also been controversial, particularly for providers that do not see many people of both types and thus are unable to cross subsidize high payments for one against low payments for others. Commercially licensed HMOs have also disagreed with mandatory stop loss since they would prefer to purchase such coverage independently.
The overarching issue associated with risk adjustment is its feasibility over time. The design of the system assumed that encounter data in usable form would be available more rapidly than appears to be the case. The built-in lag between claims experience and rate projection provides the state with a cushion to use fee-for-service claims pre-dating HealthChoice to set rates through 2000.
After 2000, however, the state will need usable encounter data to continue ACGbased risk adjustment. All these problems limited the ability of risk adjustment to protect providers who serve "sickies" (patients whose care is more costly).
Assuming that operational issues can be addressed, Maryland's use of ACGs represents an important advance in work on risk adjustment that has the potential to help safety net and other providers. Such adjustment is particularly valuable in Medicaid because different Medicaid eligibility criteria (e.g., low-income families vs. aged, blind, or disabled individuals) lead to differences in need and likely expenses for subgroups covered under the program. AGC-based risk adjustment is also important in states such as Maryland that deliberately structure their program in ways that may result in differences in risk distribution across health plans because of either their HMO experience or the types of patients their providers attract.
Maryland's experience also shows that it is difficult to communicate effectively about the complexity of risk-adjustment methods--whether the target audience is the staff that use the methods, MCOs that may live by them, or the policymakers that must interpret experience under them. Keeping such systems simple and easy to understand is valuable, particularly if simplicity can be achieved with limited loss of precision. Purchasers also need to recognize that MCOs will want to be able to replicate the computations used in setting rates and to understand how their plan is affected by annual change. In Maryland, risk adjustment became an overwhelmingly distracting issue when attempts to correct an error in calculating rates in Year 1 (which had the effect of overpaying MCOs) led to a change in the weights used for different rate cells in Year 2, along with changes in the algorithm used to assign enrollees to cells. The lack of notice of the change, the difficulty of cross-walking the change from year to year, and the magnitude of the financial impact spurred substantial legislative study, including a focus on cross-plan equity (because some MCOs had more individuals in cells adversely affected). Ultimately, Maryland decided to correct the error (to make payments consistent with the intended risk adjustment), but not to attempt to recapture from health plans and providers much of the associated cost (so that health plans would be affected less adversely and recognize the demands imposed by HealthChoice). HealthChoice fortunately had accrued sufficiently adequate savings in other areas that additional funding was not an issue it would otherwise be.
LESSONS FOR SAFETY NET PROTECTION: MARYLAND'S EXPERIENCE IN CONTEXT
Maryland's experience suggests that explicit consideration of safety net effects in developing a Medicaid managed care strategy is valuable because it forces policymakers to consider their goals up front and to decide how program policy can be structured best to balance competing interests while accounting for features unique to the care delivery environment. Medicaid managed care program has weaknesses that generate adverse operational effects. That is, it is valuable to make it possible for safety net providers to participate in the system, but this only means something if it is a system that works. At a minimum, expecting more of plans and providers than the state may be willing to pay for leads to tension, as in Maryland, which imposed substantial quality requirements while seeking a 10% savings.* Maryland intends to use encounter data to monitor plan performance. MCOs and providers, however, expressed concern over the demands imposed by these care delivery and associated data requirements, especially at the point of patient
care. Practical problems meeting the requirements include difficulties locating individuals (when address files are poorly constructed, with gaps or errors), issues related to communicating health risk information from broker to plan to participating provider, and the cumulative burden of the requirements on providers, particularly those in small offices that lack the infrastructure to handle *Maryland regulations hold MCOs responsible for providing timely preventive and primary care. Beneficiaries are to be seen within 90 days of enrollment unless their health risk appraisal (obtained at enrollment by the broker) shows that they are at high risk, in which case they need to be seen within 15 days. Enrollees must be notified about wellness services, and there are specific standards for scheduling appointments of different types. Special protections are accorded to seven groups of individuals with special needs: homeless individuals, pregnant and postpartum women, children with special needs, individuals with developmental disabilities, individuals with physical disabilities, individuals with HIV/AIDS, and individuals in need of substance abuse treatment. These people also are entitled to have their care coordinated and managed in accordance with special standards. the burden and that have little experience with Medicaid and its documentation requirements.
Maryland's experience also shows why a sound implementation process is just as important as design in developing a sound program. Rapid implementation of broad-based enrollment when administrative systems are not established to handle it results in confusion and high rates of autoenrollment. In particular, some individuals in Maryland (such as the homeless) had no idea they had been assigned to a plan. Implementation problems may most adversely affect providers who need protection the most because of their limited capacity to offset losses or transitional costs. Though many components of the Maryland system have merit, the state's experience shows that it was not practical to pursue them all at once. For example, the state's analytic infrastructure (e.g., encounter data)
could not support the demands of risk adjustment and quality monitoring. In addition, it was difficult to put extensive care management requirements into effect quickly among providers whose practices could support them and whose plans were not structured to provide the communication technology needed to transfer information from state to plan to provider and back, particularly on a real-time basis.
A look at Maryland together with our other study states also highlights how the Maryland experience relates to the broader issues of coverage, a concern in many states. Our research across multiple states suggests that the effects of Medicaid managed care on the safety net--and the tradeoffs likely to be required between competing objectives--vary by state and community. While it is difficult to disentangle cause from effect, it would appear that it is easier to protect the safety net under Medicaid managed care, under which it already has some protections that leave it stronger and more able to compete. These protections include a strong independent funding stream for safety net providers and a welldeveloped management infrastructure. For example, hospitals in Maryland have benefited from a rate-setting system that includes all payers and that compensates hospitals for the reasonable costs of the uninsured. That, plus the fact that Maryland hospitals tend to have a mixed payer base, means that hospital systems are stronger financially and will be better able to position themselves when the state moves to Medicaid managed care. In Florida and in some Texas hospital districts such as Dallas (Parkland Hospital), tax-supported local financing and strong teaching affiliations that generate a diverse patient mix have enhanced the capacity of the public hospital to competeJ 6' 17 But, independent funding alone is not sufficient.
Some hospital districts in Texas (Houston and Fort Worth) were still affected adversely by Medicaid managed care despite funding because they were highly dependent on Medicaid funds and had weaker management that was not as able to position the institutions to prosper under a more competitive environment.
Our studies suggest that protecting the safety net is most difficult in states and communities where safety net providers shoulder most of the burden of care for both the uninsured and Medicaid patients, resulting in a commingling of funds that makes the potential loss of Medicaid patients more acute. California is a good example. The state relies on different models of managed care for counties with and without major public systems (e.g., Los Angeles vs. Orange and Sacramento counties, respectively). In Los Angeles County and in many other counties, the two-plan model evolved to guarantee the traditional public system a specific share of the market.
It is also harder to protect smaller and non-hospital-based safety net providers.
As Maryland discovered, providers such as clinics are particularly vulnerable to transitional problems. For example, clinics may lose out if autoassignment is dominant in the program because clinic patients seem to be more likely to be affected by autoassignment. That is, when patients are assigned automatically, safety net providers may get a disproportionately low share assigned to them, and their ability to control this is limited because the health plan controls decisions. The design of enrollment material may also put clinics at a disadvantage if the material is organized by physician name when clinic patients identify more with the clinic than with a particular physician.
The experience of the study states also highlights the value to a state of careful consideration of all the ways Medicaid managed care may affect the safety net.
In Texas, for example, several hospital districts know they will treat the uninsured anyway because the districts are responsible for indigent care. Therefore, the hospital district plans intend to compete by guaranteeing care for enrollees even if they lose Medicaid coverage. Giving hospital districts a role in the system can encourage continuity of care when there is extensive movement of Medicaideligible people on and off the rolls. Texas initially did not require health plans sponsored by public hospital systems to be chosen as participating plans, but later added this requirement after adverse publicity over the exclusion of the Harris County (Houston) hospital under the competitive bidding system used to select MCOs. In retrospect, the need to address this issue after the fact rather than before delayed Texas' phased implementation of Medicaid managed care.
Our work suggests that moving to Medicaid managed care inevitably will draw funds away from indigent care and from providers that treat uninsured low-income individuals unless states consciously consider the tradeoffs and choose to structure their policies to minimize the chance of redirecting funds. Even so, adverse effects could still arise. Protection is especially important in communities where safety net providers play a critical role in caring for the uninsured and rely on program funding streams that are closely intertwined with Medicaid.
Some of the states we studied--Oregon, Minnesota, and Tennessee--made efforts to minimize the effect of disruptions on the safety net by expanding coverage and eligibility when they moved to Medicaid managed care. Despite substantial gains, all states found that their progress toward universal coverage was limited as legislative and public support for funding such expansion grew more difficult to obtain. The lack of universal coverage and the barriers to achieving it underscore the importance of considering--as Maryland, California, Texas, and Florida did in different ways--the structure of Medicaid managed care and its effects on safety net providers, especially in states concerned with low-income individuals who are covered publicly and with those not covered at all. Maryland's experience gives us a tool for understanding better the issues involved in moving the Medicaid managed care programmable features that may be relevant to protecting safety net providers and how to form realistic goals and expectations.
